Hello Fellow Traders,

The October Month Issue of Currency Trader Magazine is now available.. you can download it by clicking here.


happy trading.
Make Pips, Keep It, Repeat It!
hemant.

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Hi all,

In this article we will discuss the various ways to implement a stop loss order. Every trader who has had dealings in any of the financial markets is familiar with placing and executing a stop loss order, but many are mistaken that a stop loss order is always numerical. On the contrary, there are many traders (even professional hedge fund managers) who use what is colloquially termed a “mental stop” which stop is a stop loss point determined by factors other than the price, such as events, volatility, volume, option positioning, or any other comparable data. Such a stop is no less valid than a numerical one, and certainly no less effective, but one does need a lot more discipline to execute it successfully.

The great advantage of a non-numerical stop-loss order is its partial immunity to price swings. If the trader has confidence in his analysis, and is satisfied that standing firm in the face of market volatility is sensible and acceptable given the major dynamics and currents in the market, maintaining positions with non-numerical stop loss orders can be advisable and lucrative. In order to manage the inevitable large swings in account value, professional managers will implement hedging strategies in addition to money management methods, to control and minimize the volatility of the portfolio. Thus, even if the mental stop triggers a large drawndown in our position, we can minimize the effect on the portfolio through diversifying and distributing the risk among various currency pairs.

Let us examine the various ways of implementing a stop-loss order now.



Equity Stop

An equity stop is one where the position will be closed in case the total equity in an account falls below a certain value. A stop loss at 2 percent of total equity is generally regarded as a conservative strategy, while the maximum is 5 percent for most money management methods. Thus, to give an example, a 1000 USD account would have the stop loss for an open position at the point where to the total equity would fall below 980 USD.

Both the disadvantage, and the advantage of the equity stop is its inflexibility. The equity stop provides a very solid criterion for deciding on the success or failure of a single trade, as there’s no way of being mistaken about an account in the red. On the other hand, the same inflexibility may prevent the trade from functioning as expected. The markets are volatile, and a trade that has a perfectly valid cause behind it may yet be invalidated by the random fluctuations that are not predictable.

Another important problem with the equity stop is its inability to prevent a string of losses. For instance, when the trader closes a position at a two percent loss, there’s nothing that will prevent him from opening another position in the same direction (buy or sell) a short while later, if the causes that justified the first trade are still in place. For instance, if the trader enters a sell order when the RSI is above 80, and consequently the stop loss is triggered, and the position closed, there’s little that will prevent the same events from being repeated if the price action repeats the same movements. In order to avoid this pitfall, the trader can tie the stop loss point to a non-price factor, and the rest of this article discusses such scenarios.

Chart Stop

In a chart stop, the trader will place the stop loss order not at a price point, but at a chart point which may be static or dynamic. For instance, a stop loss order may be placed at a fibonacci level, which would be a static value. On the other hand, the trader may use an API (an automated trading system), or mentally prepare himself to close the position if a technical event, such as a crossover, a breakout, or divergence occurs, which would constitute a dynamic stop-loss point. In all these cases, technical analysis generates the triggers and determines the price where the position must be closed.

The chart stop is more flexible and reliable than a direct equity stop, because it adjusts to price action and volatility, and is therefore somewhat independent of the random movements of the price. The problem with the chart stop is twofold. First, the technical indicator used to generate the signals may fail to capture the change of the market trend, resulting in large losses. The other, and obvious problem is related to the indirect character of the stop-loss mechanism. Because the order is independent of the price, it may not be able to cut losses as effectively as a direct equity stop, and larger than expected losses may materialize as a result.

Volatility Stop

A volatility stop depends on volatility indicators, such as the VIX for determining the exit point for the trade. As such, market panics and shocks will cause the order to be executed, but mere price fluctuations in the currency market which lack their counterpart in other asset classes will be ignored for the most part. The trader who utilizes a volatility stop expresses the opinion that unless a major, unexpected shock hits the market, his position should be held regardless of the behavior of the markets. This is a more risky strategy than the equity stop, but can be profitable and valid depending on market conditions and the economic environment. In general, it is doubtful that a volatility stop can be very useful in a very nervous and volatile market. But it could be very helpful in maintaining a long-term position where risk perception is low.

The volatility stop is sensitive to prices, but only in an indirect manner, and its nature is similar to the chart stop. It is useful for eliminating very short term distortions from our analysis, and allows us greater resilience in the face of noise in the data.

Volatility may fail to react to market swings. Sometimes a large fall in the market has no equivalent rise in the various volatility gauges. Similarly, volatility can at times rise without any obvious corresponding price action. Consequently, a volatility stop (and similar stops based on non-price data) can be triggered even before a trade is in the red. All these must be kept in mind if the trader decides to use this type of stop order.

Volume Stop

When the trader expects an ongoing trend to be reversed or invalidated subsequent to a change in volume, a volume stop maybe appropriate. While volume statistics are not available for the forex market, positioning as depicted by the COT report can be used for establishing this type of stop. For utilizing the order, the trader determines a percentage value on futures positioning above or below which the position must be liquidated, depending on market conditions and the nature of the order. In the same context, other types of data can also be used to generate a stop loss trigger point. A particular put/call ratio, or option risk reversal value may all be chosen to provide the equivalent of a volume stop in the stock market.

In example, let’s consider a trader who opens a short position in a carry trader pair, confirming his trade by developments in the stock market. His expectation is that the recent rise in the stock market indexes (and the corresponding rise in the carry pairs) occurred on low volume, and will soon be reversed in the absence of new money flows. Consequently, he places his stop-loss at a volume level which, if reached in a rising market, will invalidate the starting premise, and cause the position to be liquidated. When this occurs, and volume rises above the preconceived level, the trader will close his short position in the carry trade pair.

Margin Stop

The margin stop is not really a stop loss order, but the absence of it. In this case the trader will let his account absorb the unrealized losses until a margin call is triggered, and a large part of the account is gone. The margin stop is a sign of indiscipline and lack of insight, because a diligent trader will always predetermine the conditions that will lead to the closing and liquidation of a position. Since not even the brightest analyst is capable of predicting the future with any certainty, lack of a stop loss order is an indefensible practice.

Notwithstanding the previous, the margin stop is a popular choice among many traders who are unable to remain calm in the face of the great emotional pressures of trading. It is only viable under really low leverage such as 2:1, and even then a margin stop would not be the best choice. At much higher leverage, the margin stop is completely indefensible, and should be avoided altogether

Event Stop

Fundamental analysts do make use of technical tools, if only for determining the trigger points for a trade. Take profit, and stop loss orders are used by almost every trader in the world, and its is unthinkable that a serious analyst will not have a condition, at least in mind, for closing an open position, however convinced he may be of its ultimate validity.

But fundamental analysts are not limited to technical tools and the price action for determining when to exit a trade. The event stop that we would like to discuss here is a tool that the trader can use to determine a trade’s exit point.

When using the event stop, the trader will ignore the price action for the most part (and will use low leverage), and will only close a position in the red when the scenario he had pictured in his mind becomes contradicted by events. For instance, a trader is anticipating that Bank A will be nationalized by the authorities of Nation X, and he expects that this will lead to X’s currency depreciating against its counterparts. In consequence, he shorts it. He will refuse to close the position until authorities confirm and clarify, in a solid and unmistakable fashion, that they will refuse to nationalize Bank A. In the meantime, he will be willing to put up with all the rumors, extreme swings, and short term fluctuations in the market without worrying about the unrealized profit or loss in his account.

As we mentioned at the beginning, the event stop is for those traders who know what they do, and who possess the track record, the intellectual background, and the confidence to use it. But do not take our word in order to evaluate your own skills; you should know yourself better than anybody else, and if you believe that you understand the economic dynamics of the era, and can defend your claim in your trading activities, you will be perfectly capable of using the event stop.
Conclusion

The best choice for the beginner is the equity stop. During the learning process, the trader can concentrate on bettering his understanding of the markets without worrying about excessive losses. Once the trader gains a good understanding of market dynamics, and is able to form and implement his trading plans, the equity stop will quickly lose its attractiveness.

The best method for using the non-price stop orders is combining them with a wide equity stop which will serve as a final safety precaution in case the price action becomes too dangerous. For instance, a trader can long the EUR/JPY pair and hold it indefinitely until the VIX registers a value above 35, where a v9olatility stop would be placed. At the same time he will protect himself from extreme, and unexpected swings by placing an equity stop at 5-7 percent of total equity. Thus, unless a very large price swing completely overruns the main criterion for the stop loss order, and triggers the equity stop, the trade would be maintained indefinitely.

Needless to say, every trader will have his own choices on stop loss orders. And we would like to conclude this section by noting that the key to a successful stop-loss order is a disciplined risk management strategy, and everything else is just detail.

Happy trading.
Make Pips, Keep It, Repeat It!
hemant.

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Fundamental analysis examines the reasons behind the price action. The analyst uses economic indicators and news flows to decide on the causes behind price movements. Since one cannot determine the cause of something which has not yet happened, the causal relationships demonstrated by fundamental analysis are always about present market behavior. Nonetheless, economic events move slower than market developments, and this is the real cause of the great predictive and interpretative power of fundamental analysis.

Technical analysis is a relatively new phenomenon. It has been developed mostly in the last century, for the most part by US-based traders, for providing some clarity to short term price actions. Fundamental analysis, on the other hand, has been with us for many centuries. The ancient speculator of the Peloponnesian War in Classical Greece used news flow (hearsay, public meetings) and economic data on supply and demand (starvation, poor harvest) for stockpiling resources and for deciding when to sell them. The ancient Chinese classic Shiji, which records the lives and exploits of important personages two millennia before our time, reports on successful traders and speculators who traded wartime shortages, or the needs of warlords for massive profits. Some of these people were middlemen who exploited the inefficiencies of ancient markets, others were producers themselves with good insight into macro-scale developments, and patience allowed them to successfully utilize their analytical capabilities. But all of them used news and analysis to profit from fundamental developments, without any tool other than common sense to help them.

During the Middle Ages there were the Fugger and the Medici families who took advantage of their good relationships with royalty and governments to stay one step ahead of the markets. The Rotschild family of the 18th-19th centuries also used fundamental imbalances created by warfare to undertake contracts with sovereigns states and for maximizing profits. The twentieth century, of course, has had more than its fair share of traders and speculators capitalizing on market distortions, imbalances and bubbles for very large profits. But at the basic level, the tools of the successful investor, trader or speculator are the same: a good understanding of fundamental data, deaf ears to hyperbole, euphoria and panic, and the strength of will to act when the time is right.

Human life and natural phenomena move on causal relationships. Causality is a major principle of scientific study.



And, given how our brains function, it is not possible to make any meaningful decision, judgment or choice without backing it with sensible causes. This is also where the power of fundamental analysis originates. The charts of the technical analyst may give all kinds of profit alerts, signals and alarms, but there’s little in the charts that tell us why a group of people make the choices that create the price patterns. Ultimately, most transactions in the financial markets have reasons that are independent of technical values in the long-term. If a stock goes down in response to a temporary bout of panic among traders, the price will rebound once the dust settles; or, if a currency pair plummets in value because of a false rumor or a temporary squeeze of capital, the situation will inevitably be corrected once a stream of concrete data establishes the false nature of the fears.

Fundamental analysis allows us to decide on the value of an asset. We are unable to be certain about the future value of an asset, and past value is never a good indicator for future prices. But, by all means, we posses the faculties and resources necessary for deciding if the price of an asset is expensive or not, and that is the basis on which the fundamental analyst bases his choices. We can establish the causes behind a trend, we can establish if they are ongoing, and we can exploit that knowledge to bring us profits.

There are many traders who successfully used fundamental analysis to obtain great wealth, but the exploits of George Soros, and his Quantum Hedge Fund have made them household names in our era, particularly after the notorious Black Wednesday on which Britain was forced to drop out of the European exchange rate mechanism. In the rest of this article we will examine this interesting event to drive home the great power of fundamental analysis and how accurate and profitable its predictions can be.

Most traders today know that the British pound is not a part of the Eurosystem. It is an independent currency managed by its own central bank. While some may attribute this fact to the insular mentality of the British and their typical desire for independence from continental customs and habits, this is not the real cause of the existence of the pound today. The real reasons are to be found in the developments of September 16th 1992, and the events leading up to them.

Before it was launched, the nations which today share the Euro as their national currency had to abide by an agreement known as the European Exchange rate mechanism (ERM) which was the precursor to the eventual unification of currencies. The ERM stipulated a fixed currency exchange rate between each national currency and the ECU (the European currency unit, which would eventually be called the Euro), but bilateral currency values were allowed to float within a margin of 2.25 of the the fixed rate. The ERM was created in 1979, and Britain was one of the later members of the EU to join the mechanism in 1990.

At the time Britain joined, the government of Margaret Thatcher was lost in intrigues and disputes about the benefits and the need for ERM. With inflation at 15 percent, to restrain the expansionism of the previous era, the British government had for a while been mirroring the Bundesbank’s policy rates. The decision to join was partly taken to formalize this policy of copying the central bank rates of Western Germany, and also as a result of an argument between the chancellor of the exchequer (the equivalent of the Treasury secretary), Nigel Lawson and the prime minister’s economic advisor, which resulted in the resignation of Lawson. He was replaced by the future prime minister John Major, who in turn finalized the entry of Britain into the ERM in 1990 at a rate of 2.95DM to the pound, with commitment to intervene at 2.778.

As we just mentioned, at the time of Britain’s entry inflation was quite high, due to the expansionist policies of Nigel Lawson. The easy money policy had created a period of boom at the end of the 80’s, but it had also created a property bubble and high inflation which had to be restrained by higher interest rates and a period of economic downturn. Thus, when the crisis struck two years after UK’s adoption of the ERM, economic conditions were already far from being ideal. Unfortunately for the British, this was also a time when German interest rates were even higher than the British rates, as the Bundesbank tried to control the inflationary impact of reunification-related spending.

Mr. Soros, who enters the scene at about this point, had established his Quantum Fund in the early 1970s in partnership with the equally famous Jim Rogers, his initial capital being provided by a number of wealthy acquaintances including the aforementioned Rotschild family. Before his rise to notoriety through his role in the British debacle, he had already made massive profits in trading the collapse of currency pegs and economic deregulation of the 70s. He and his analysts had impressive skills in analyzing the fundamental factors that drive the international economy. Indeed, apart from being a rich financier, Mr. Soros has books published on philosophy and politics, and he is equally well-known as a philanthropist and for his contributions to liberal movements around the world.

Upon analyzing the fundamental situation of the British economy and the increasing gap between the performance of the British and German economies at the time of Britain’s adoption of the ERM, Mr. Soros was increasingly convinced that the British would drop out of the system regardless of the choices they made. The fundamental health of the UK economy was incapable of coping with the demands of matching Germany at the time. Thus, he began shorting the pound as early as spring 1992, in anticipation that high interest rates would eventually deepen the recession in the UK economy, and the resulting fall of asset prices would prove unpalatable to the government authorities. It is thought that he accumulated short positions reaching 6.5 billion pounds (about 10 billion USD), at a leverage of 1:10.

Meanwhile, the situation of Britain continued to deteriorate as the USD kept depreciating, making British exports less competitive on a global basis. The breaking point came, as it often happens, through political turmoil. When in spring 1992 the Danes refused to join the ERM, and it was decided that France would have a referendum on the issue as well, the resulting nervous atmosphere reached climax in a general distrust of the currency pegs of nations that were suffering the worst of the ERM.

On Wednesday, 16th September 1992, as speculators kept selling the pound, the British cabinet held meeting after meeting on how to defend the nation’s currency. They first raised the main rate to 10, then to 12, eventually promised to raise to 15 percent in order to convince the speculators that they were facing the full determination and might of the UK government. The government also bought billions of pounds to prop up the currency, but all that was in vain. Heedless monetary expansionism of the Lawson Boom had created massive imbalances in the British financial system, and the British economy would never be able to function under such a high interest rate burden. Speculators like George Soros had already made their calculations and had discovered the untenable nature of the British peg a long time ago through fundamental analysis, and they would not be cowed into submission by the frantic, but ultimately futile endeavors of the John Major Government.

By 19:00 it was already clear that the peg couldn’t be defended, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to declare that the government would leave the ERM framework, and the main interest rate would remain at 12 percent. The credibility of the British government was destroyed in a few hours, the speculators left for new hunts, and George Soros pocketed an estimated 1 billion USD in the process. As the person who took the largest bet, he was instantly notorious across the globe, and to this day he’s known as "the man who broke the Bank of England".

Later, it was also admitted that the 15 percent promise was just a ruse created to calm the markets, and as many speculators believed, the government had no intention of holding the rates at such a high level given the difficulties the British economy were going through.

It is an exciting story, but the sensational value of the events has no use for our trading practices. What are the lessons that we gain from this disaster for the UK economy?

1. Fundamental analysis is always right. Imbalances will always be corrected. But it takes time and patience to exploit them successfully. Mr. Soros held his position for months before market developments confirmed his expectations.
2. Neither government authorities, nor company heads are immune to the temptation of lying, or “bluffing” as it’s sometimes called. If you’re a speculator, nobody will have any sympathy for you if you lose money, and the only person you can blame is yourself. So be careful about your leverage, your risk and who you believe.
3. Macroeconomic events are often triggered by political developments. Political events rarely cause major economic shocks by themselves alone, but accumulated imbalances are usually balanced as a result of political shocks.
4. The payback time of expansion fueled by monetary expansionism is exceptionally destructive in any economy. If the economic leadership of a nation is constrained by political obstacles when the payback time arrives, the results are doubly disastrous.

If you intend to use fundamental analysis in the way George Soros used it, you will need a good understanding of both politics and economics. Achieving such a skill is not that hard, provided you have the commitment and the patience to complete your task.

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Hello Fellow Traders,

The September Month Issue of Currency Trader Magazine is now available.. you can download it by clicking here.


happy trading.
Make Pips, Keep It, Repeat It!
hemant.

Read more...

That high leverage is dangerous is well-known to most people, but it is not unusual to make spectacular profits with a highly leveraged account, just as it is not unusual throw three heads in a row during a coin-tossing competition. The sad fact is that even those spectacular profits are highly likely to be wiped out if the trader continues to make bets utilizing high leverage, as we examined in the previous articles on gambling strategies in forex. The inability of the trader to get rid of high leverage after a bout of successful trades is related to a concept called the “gambler’s conceit”. The gambler’s conceit is not caused by high leverage only, but we will limit our discussion of this subject to high leverage since it’s so common among traders.

Many of us have that genie beside our ears who whispers to us all the time that risking too much is not a problem because we are wise enough to exit a risky bet while still running profits. High leverage may be wrong, undercapitalization may be dangerous, but our trades have so far been profitable, and as soon as the profits diminish or losses are being registered, we will close our positions, and exit the game, be it gambling with cards or gambling with forex.

It's very convincing. After all, why would one want to risk losing the profits of such a risky practice as high leverage? What is the point of continuing to practice a losing strategy even after your profits have been halved by a string of losses?

Many beginning traders who make a lot of money


randomly in the forex market in a short period of time are convinced that it is their method, style, attitude that makes those large profits possible. On the other hand, the experience and knowledge possessed by a trader at the start of his career is insufficient for practicing self-control or employing money management methods successfully. Thus, in many cases (but not always), the doubling, or tripling of the account of a new trader is just a chance event, regardless of the rationalizations which the trader uses to explain his situation. What is more, even in the case of a highly successful, highly disciplined trader, the occasional very large profits are not at all a sign of increased efficiency or better understanding: There’s nothing extraordinary about the occasional extremes in a trader’s career. Instead of emphasizing them too much, and thinking about what he did right or wrong to deserve such large profits or losses, the seasoned trader will evaluate them for what they are: statistical anomalies on which neither a career, nor a trading strategy can be based.

The Gambler’s conceit prevents such a rational explanation. Instead of understanding the gains after highly-leveraged bets as random developments, the trader ties these results to his own exceptional luck, skill, or insight in evaluating the market action, or to his superior trading strategy, and convinces himself that he will be able to terminate his trading activity due to his controlling power over his trading results. With such false confidence, when the inevitable large losses occur he will ponder on what went wrong with his trade, which indicator, which scheme he needs to revise and refine, instead of accepting and understanding that gains on highly leveraged bets are illusory, and unlikely to remain with him permanently. When a peer confronts him about the unusually high leverage of his trades, and his irrational expectation that he can keep profiting with such high risks, he will protest by mentioning his past successes.

In fact, gains on a highly leveraged account have the potential to be even more destructive than losses. Losses will teach the trader to be humble, and will lead him to revise his methods. Gains, on the other hand, will addict him to his errors. Sadly, such an addiction can only be broken by the pain of a totally wiped-out account sometimes. Fortunately for you, we’re here to warn you about the dangers associated with this risky practice.

The best remedy of the gambler’s conceit is avoidance of the addiction entirely. Instead of consoling yourself that you will give up the practice once the profits are gone, convince yourself to never begin the unhealthy game. Do not aim at exceptional results; aim at consistency. But if you find that you’re already deep into the game of high leverage and risky practices, our advise to you is to cut it off right now, without waiting for the losses to show up. Just close the chapter, quit trading for a while, and a few weeks later, or maybe a month, restart your career by practicing sane and sensible strategies this time. Not only will you find intellectual satisfaction at having overcome a dangerous addiction, you will also have a profitable path before yourself as you improve your skills, recognize your errors.

To repeat, brief periods of enormous profits is never the purpose of a successful trader. Such periods are always temporary, and the false confidence that becomes instilled your psyche is often destructive to your career as a trader: aim at consistent profits, do not aim at high very high profits.

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